Saad Eddin Ibrahim
Ibn Khaldoun Center, Cairo
All the world's armed conflicts since 1988, with the possible exception of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, have been over internal ethnic issues. In fact since 1945, ethnic conflicts have claimed some 15 million lives, several times those resulting from inter-state wars. At present, ethnic conflicts span three old continents. Typical examples are those in Burma and Sri Lanka in Asia; Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda in Africa, the former USSR and Yugoslavia in Europe. [1]
With only 8 per cent of world population, the Arab-Middle East has had some 25 per cent of all the world's armed conflicts since 1945. Most of these conflicts have been ethnically-based. Summary Table (1) shows the balance of inter-state and inter-ethnic armed conflicts in the region in terms of human and material cost. Though considered by all concerned as the principal one, the Arab-Israeli conflict (some six wars and a continued Palestinian and Lebanese struggle against Israeli occupation) has claimed some 200,000 lives in forty years. In contrast, during the same period, ethnic conflicts have claimed several times as many lives. The Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) alone matched the same number of casualties as all the Arab-Israeli wars. The Sudanese civil war (on and off since 1956) has claimed at least five times as many lives as all Arab-Israeli wars. The same relative costs apply in terms of population displacement, material devastation, and financial expenditure. [2]
In the 1990s, we expect that the armed conflicts in the region will be more of the intra-state than of the inter-state variety. Militant Islamic activism is to be added to the on-going sources of armed civil strife in a score of Arab-Middle Eastern countries. Algeria and Egypt are currently two prominent cases in point. Thus, the greatest threat to security of the states in the region are likely to be internal. [3] The manipulation or spillover effects of each internal armed conflicts could, of course, lead to interstate conflicts as well. This paper, however, deals with only one type, the ethnically based, internal conflicts.
The disproportionality of ethnic conflicts vis-à-vis inter-state conflicts is more surprising in view of the global socio-cultural demographics of the Arab world. With the broadest definition of "ethnicity" as referring to contiguous or co-existing groups differing in race, religion, sect, language, culture or national origin, [4] the Arab world is one of the more ethnically homogeneous area in the world today.
In 1993, the Arab world had a population of slightly over 236 million. The overwhelming majority (80.0 per cent, i.e. 190 million) share the same ethnic characteristics. Racially, they are a Semitic-Hamitic-Caucasian mix. Religiously, they are Muslims of the Sunni denomination. Culturally and linguistically, they are Arabic speaking natives (See Appendix for detailed Tables). In terms of national origin, they have been rooted for many centuries in the same "Arab Homeland" (extending from Morocco on the Atlantic ocean to Bahrain in the Arab Persian Gulf). This overwhelming majority (of 80 per cent) gets even bigger as we add groups which differ in only one ethnic variable that is perceived by the respective group itself as being a marginal element in the definition of its identity. For example, most Shi'a Muslims and most Christians living in the Arab world consider their "Arabism" as the primary axis of their identity, superseding their "Shi'aism" or "Christianity". For them, the "linguistic-cultural" variable is the more salient ethnic divide. On this basis the Arab "majority" jumps to over 86.0 per cent of the population in the Arab world. Summary Table (2) shows the major ethnic groupings in the Arab world along four dimensions: cultural-linguistic, religious, denominational, and racial.
Despite the apparent ethnic homogeneity on the pan-Arab level, we observe marked ethnic heterogeneities in several countries - e.g. Sudan, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Bahrain, and Yemen. In these nine countries, as many as 35 per cent of the population differ from the Arab Muslim Sunni Caucasian majority in one or more of the four ethnic variables (of language, religion, sect, or race). It is noted that nearly all nine countries are located at the outer rim of the Arab world, often intersecting a cultural borderland. In all nine countries, there has been some overt form of ethnic tension. In four of them - Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen - such tensions have flared up in recent decades into an armed protracted conflict. The unity and territorial integrity of each has been seriously threatened. [5]
Despite the preponderance of ethnic conflicts in the Arab world, Arab social scientists and political activists alike have not given the phenomenon its due share of attention. Marxists, nationalists, and Islamists have tended to ignore the ethnic question or write it off as a residual of some other problems. The "foreign factor" (e.g. imperialists and Zionists) has been offered as a common, explanation underlying most ethnic conflicts in the Arab world. [6] While such a factor is not to be dismissed, a new generation of Arab social scientists is now going far beyond such conspiratorial explanations of ethnic conflicts. [7] The remainder of this paper offers an account of these new endeavors, discussed under the following four problematique-headings as they bear on the ethnic question in the Arab world:
The four problematiques are generally inter-connected in all Arab countries; but their interplay is particularly acute in those countries with greater ethnic heterogeneity. The disintegration of traditional Islamic polities in the 19th century, the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire (1922), and the concomitant or subsequent Western colonial designs led to the fragmentation of the Arab world and the embryonic beginnings of modern "territorial states" in the inter-war period (1918-1939). [8] As these states gained political independence in the 1940s-1960s period, they inherited equally fragmented ethnic minorities. The political space was replete with challenges that had to do with forging a national identity, state-building, consolidating independence, achieving socio-economic development, and insuring a reasonable measures of equity. Moreover, these challenges were to be met in an international system polarized by the ideological and geopolitical conflict of the Cold War.
In this vision, all Muslims are considered equal regardless of their race, culture, or national origin. Accordingly, Kurds (in Iraq and Syria), Berbers (in Algeria and Morocco) and Blacks (in Mauritania and Sudan) are not considered "minorities". Together these Muslim (but non-Arab) groups number over 2.0 million. This Islamist vision of the "political order" would naturally be welcomed by non-Arab but Muslim members of the continuity, in which "citizenship" is based on religion. Obviously, in such a polity non-Muslims in the Arab world feel quite threatened, as well as alienated.
Thus, while the Islamists would exclude "non-Muslims", the Arab nationalists would exclude "non-Arabs" from full-fledged membership in the polity. At present (1994), the size of the latter is some 2.0 million. On the other hand, non-Muslim Arabs are to be fully integrated in the national political community. At present (1994), these amount to some 18.0 million (mostly Christians).
Naturally non-Arabs would feel threatened by the Arab nationalist vision. This is particularly the case with sizeable non-Arab communities which have national aspirations of their own (e.g. the Kurds) or who are keen on preserving their cultural integrity and language (e.g. the Berbers). Also, some non-Muslim communities fear that despite its secular appearance, Arab nationalism has its Islamic underpinnings. This apprehension is to be found explicitly among the Maronite Christians of Lebanon, and implicitly among the Christian Copts of Egypt. [12]
Thus each of the competing paradigms of identity in the Arab world would exclude what the other would include in their respective definition of the political community. We will see how modern state-builders, in practice, have tried to cope with this dilemma; by the subtle evolving of country nationalism referred to as "wataniyya." [13]
Both the Islamic and nationalist visions have failed to take into account sub-identities within their own broad primordial frame of reference. Thus, Islamic visionaries have tended to down play sectarian cleavages within and between fellow Muslims. In the Lebanese civil war (1975-1989), more Shi'a and Sunni Muslims killed each other than they killed Christians. Indeed, more Shi'a Muslims killed each other than they killed Sunni and Druze Muslims; and than Christians of all sects. By the same token, more Christians were killed by other Christians than of or by Muslims in the Lebanese civil war. [15]
Nor would proponents of the Islamic vision of a political identity take much comfort from the infighting among Afghani Muslim Mujahideen which claimed more Muslim casualties in three years (1990-1993) than the entire 10 years war of resistance against the Soviet and Soviet-backed regime (1980-1990). [16] Equally, proponents of the pan-Arab nationalist vision have been seriously discredited by actions of regimes espousing that vision. The quarter of a century-long rivalry between the two Baathist regimes in Iraq and Syria is a dramatic case in point. It just happens that the élite of each regime belongs to a different religious Muslim minority sect in their respective countries. [17]
Much of the tension in North Yemen (1970-1990) and then in unified Yemen (1990-1994), which escalated into a full fledged civil war in mid 1994 has not been without its Muslim sectarian undertones. Despite official denials by all parties in the conflict, the hidden but persistent cleavage has been between the Shi'a Muslim zaydis of the North and the Sunni Muslim shawafi of the South. [18]
Thus, elegant and neat as the two competing visions of identities in the Arab world may be, they have failed in practice to project a coherent or consistent political program. They have failed to deal with sub-identities, let alone their interplay with other socio-econornic variables.
In practice, nearly every Arab state today has avoided the clear dichotomies of choice - such as between religious vs. secular, or national vs. country (qawmiyya vs. wataniyya) - in forging their politic-cultural identities. Instead each Arab state (or regime) has attempted its own reconciliation, with greater emphasis on one particular dimension but never to the total exclusion of the other. Hence, it is possible to plot the Arab states on the two continua of "religious-secular" and "country (watan) - Arab nation (umma arabiyya)", as the following diagram shows:
The above pragmatic handling of reconciling secular and religious considerations was not the only issue in forging the identity of the new states. Early state-builders also had to contend with reconciling pan-Arab national considerations with those of sub-national identities (qawmi vs. qatri). The leaders of the pan-Arab movement who had rallied around Sherif Hussein of Mecca in the Great Arab Revolt (1916) were frustrated as Britain and France reneged on their promises of Arab independence and unification (as was later revealed by the Sykes-Picot secret agreement). Yet Arab nationalist hopes remained alive. With the successive independence of one country after another in mid-century, early state-builders made another pragmatic reconciliation. In their constitutions or declarations of independence, it was often stipulated that while their country is declared as an "independent sovereign state" it nonetheless remains an integral part of the "Arab Nation" or the "Arab Homeland", waiting for the opportune moment to "reunite with the other Arab parts". [21]
The establishment of the League of Arab States in 1945 was a formalization of this compromise. It ensured the separate independence of its member states but kept the future door open for gradual measures of cooperation, integration, and unification.
Thus while Arab ideologists debated their competing visions some of which were mutually exclusive, practical statesmen and politicians engaged in the "art of the possible". The above two compromises were cases in point; and operated reasonably well during the early decades of independence in several Arab countries which adopted a "liberal" or quasi-liberal systems of governance - e.g. Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Morocco. Where sizeable ethnic groups existed they were accommodated politically under such "liberal" systems. In some cases (e.g. Lebanon and Jordan), ethnic groups were formally or explicitly recognized and allotted a proportional share in elected and ministerial councils. In others (e.g. Egypt, Syria, Iraq), similar, though implicit accommodations were practised. In other words, socio-ethnic diversity was matched by a political pluralism of one sort or another.
The end of the first liberal experiment in those Arab states during the 1950s and 1960s entailed potential problems for their ethnic communities. The military regimes which took over power in many of them adopted militant Arab nationalist ideologies and bold socio-econornic reforms. On both counts, they were bound to alienate this or that ethnic group in their respective countries. In Egypt, for example, Nasser's July 1952 Revolution alarmed non-Muslim communities on several grounds. None of the one hundred Free Officers who staged the Revolution was a Christian, when Copts alone (apart from other Christian denominations) represented some 8.0 per cent of the population. Nor were Egypt's Copts particularly enthusiastic about the new regime's Arab nationalist orientation. Worse still was the regime's socialist policies which in the aggregate hit the Christians harder, as they were disproportionately represented in the landed-bourgeoisie classes of Egypt. Something similar occurred elsewhere in the Arab world where military or single-party regimes ruled for several years. In countries with marked ethnic heterogeneity, this lack of political pluralism was bound to create tension. Even when military-single-party regimes attempted to accommodate ethnic groups, such accommodation was often either nominal, or arbitrary depending on the whims of the rulers; thus leading to further alienation of these groups. [22]
In two extreme cases, ethnic majority rule was replaced by the rule of an ethnic minority. Thus, under the ideological guise of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, an Alawite military rule has tightened its grip on the Arab Muslim Sunni majority (65 per cent) in Syria since 1970. In Iraq it is members of an Arab Muslim Sunni minority (35 per cent) which, since 1968, had the upper hand over all other ethnic groups, some of which are numerically larger, e.g. the Shi'a Muslims who account for about 45 per cent of Iraq's total population.
In the Sudan members of the ruling military elite have invariably come from one Arab Muslim northern province around the capital Khartoum. Under populist, socialist, and now Islamic guise the three military coups d'état (of 1958, 1969, and 1989) have been staged by Arab Muslim northern officers. In none of them was there a single southern non-Muslim officer at the start. Later on, a few token Southerners were added. With the exception of Egypt, the alienation of ethnic groups vis-à-vis the ruling military-ideological single-party regimes has grown into overt unrest. In Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Algeria, Somalia, and Mauritania it has erupted into violent confrontations of varying degrees during the last three decades. At present, there is protracted armed conflict in the Sudan, Somalia and Iraq. At times it is not only the legitimacy of the ruling regime which is challenged by this or that ethnic group, but also the legitimacy of the state itself. Thus, the territorial integrity of the Sudan, Somalia and Iraq are now in serious question. Several decades of a state-building process is giving way to a reverse process of state-deconstruction.
As elsewhere in developing regions, this social mobilization was accompanied or followed by a steady rise in expectations on the part of ethnic groups in the Arab world. Those expectations included quests for greater shares in power, wealth, and prestige in their newly independent countries. The brief liberal experiment in several Arab states satisfied the quest of ethnic groups for political participation, but not as much their quest for social justice i.e. an equitable share in wealth. The early years of military-ideological regimes satisfied ethnic groups or promised to do so, as far as social equity is concerned, through such redistributional measures as land reform, nationalization of foreign and upper class assets, an open and free system of education, the provision of equal opportunities and the adoption of meritocracy systems of employment. However, as these regimes got consolidated and their tenure in power lasted, even the reality and/or promise of greater equity began to erode for all non-ruling groups, including ethnic minorities.
Thus, with political participation long curtailed, and social mobilization continuing unabated, while progress in social equity coming to a halt or worsening, structural-relative deprivation has been steadily rising since the 1970s. Such deprivations have been felt more by ethnic groups than by other sectors in society. Consequently, they were the first and the loudest in expressing their resentment against what by now has become an authoritarian-bureaucratic ruling class, with ideological trappings fading into the background.
Instead of responding to such protestations by resuming the march of social equity or reopening the political system for more participation, most Arab authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes responded by greater coercion domestically and/or military adventures externally. Thus the Syrian regime got embroiled in the Lebanese civil war (since 1975); the Iraqi regime in two Gulf wars (with Iran 1980-88, and in Kuwait with an international coalition in 1990-91); the Libyan regime in Chad (1975-1988); the Algerian regime in a proxy war with Morocco in the Sahara (1976-1990); the Somali regime in the Ogaden with Ethiopia (1977); and the Mauritanian regime in series of armed skirmishes with Senegal (1990-1991).
Both mounting coercion internally and military adventures externally have had the effect of earmarking a greater share of state budgets to arms purchase and the dwindling share of social -programmes. Thus social equity continued to worsen even further for all non-ruling groups, but more so for ethnic minorities. Thus the ethnic divide in several Arab countries has been intensified by a class divide. [24] The combination of class-ethnic deprivation needed one more factor to erupt into an open armed conflict - a foreign ally. This takes us to the external question.
As early as the late 18th century rival Western powers scrambled for a client-sponsorship of various ethnic groups, that lived in the provinces of the declining Ottoman Empire, the Sick Man of Europe. This was to be a pretext for possible inheritance of such provinces upon the final demise of the Sick Man. A case in point was France's sponsorship of the Christian Maronites, Britain's of the Druze Muslims, and Russia's of the Christian Orthodox - all in one Arab-Ottoman province, Greater Syria (including Mount Lebanon). On the whole, ethnic groups in the Arab world remained long reluctant and sceptical of such unsolicited guardianship of foreign powers. But as corruption and despotism of the ailing Ottoman Empire reached an all time high, some of these groups accepted to be under such guardianships for protection not only against the central authorities but also against real or perceived threats from other indigenous ethnic groups at home.
This Nineteenth Century pattern of big powers meddling into the Arab world's ethnic affairs would continue into the twentieth century, both under direct colonial rule of fragmented Arab polities, as well as after their formal independence. The big power actors varied during the two centuries but the pattern has remained essentially the same. After World War II, with more independent or new states in the Arab-Middle East, several regional actors have also got involved, often by proxy, in the ethnic affairs of one another. Notoriously among the latter were Israel (in Lebanon, Iraq, and the Sudan), Iran (in Iraq and Lebanon), Ethiopia (in the Sudan). [25] Likewise, at times some Arab states meddled in the ethnic question of neighboring Arab and non-Arab states (e.g. Syria in Lebanon and Iraq; Iraq in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran; Sudan in Ethiopia). [26]
The big power rivalry during the Cold War (1945-1990) added an extra complicating dimension of an ideological nature to the meddling in the Arab world's ethnic question. At times factions of the same ethnic group were as much in conflict with each other as were their external patrons, regional or global. Rarely did the external factor alone trigger serious ethnic conflicts. Responsible for such conflicts, primarily, were indigenous factors of political, socio-economic, or cultural nature, of the kind discussed in sections II, III and IV above.
What the external factor did, if played out, was to intensify, complicate and protract such conflicts. This is especially the case with armed ethnic conflicts, which tend, over time, to create a political economy and a sub-political culture of their own-far beyond the original issues of the conflict. The civil wars in Lebanon, Sudan, and Iraq are dramatic cases in point. At present (1994), Iraq is de facto divided into three zones - two in the north (Kurds) and south (Shi'as) with only limited control by the central government in Baghdad. Only the middle zone (about half of Iraq) has been under the total control of the Iraqi government since its defeat in the Gulf war (1991). The other two zones are now off limits to Iraqi air power - by UN and Western Allies orders. So much is this case that the "Protected Zone" in the North has felt secure enough to elect in 1992 its own Kurdish Parliament and has its own government. [27]
Participatory politics may in some Arab countries contribute to initial political instability or lead itself to various forms of demagoguery. Rival ethnic leaders may engage in "upsmanship politics". But in the medium and long runs, responsible democratic politics is bound to prevail. In countries with sizeable ethnic groups concentrated in one province or a geographic area, "separatist tendencies" may also be expected, once the political system is opened to free expression and free balloting - as is vividly, and sometimes tragically, witnessed in the former USSR and Yugoslavia. While such a right must be conceded in principle, it could practically result in chaos.
It goes without saying that legitimate human and political rights of minorities and ethnic groups would hardly be respected unless they are also respected for the majority. In fact, as the Lebanese social scientist Antoine Messarra once observed, "no political Arab regime has had a serious problem with an ethnic minority without also having a serious problem with the majority in the same country". The Kurds and the Southern Sudanese who have long risen up in arms against their central governments have recently come to the same conclusion: their problem would not be resolved without changing the entire political system to one that is responsive and accountable to both the majority and ethnic minorities. This proposition has been summed up by the Kurdish national movement in the phrase, "democracy for all Iraqis and autonomy for the Kurds". The Sudanese Liberation Army (mostly Southerners) has adopted a similar slogan, democracy for all of the Sudan and federalism for the South".
Despite some serious armed protracted ethnic conflicts in the Arab World, there are other instances where such conflicts were well managed or altogether averted. Again, it was a combination of participatory politics and decentralization or federalism. Of special note here is the case of Berbers in Morocco and Algeria, who constitute roughly the same percentage in the total population - 25.0 - 35.0 per cent. A cultural linguistic minority, the Berbers in both countries are like the Arab majority in terms of religion and denomination - i.e. Sunni Muslims. The Berbers have been an integral and important part of Maghreb history since the seventh century AD. They took part in the Arab-Muslim conquest of the Iberian Peninsula, the Saharan and Sub-Saharan Africa. Equally, in modern times, they were subjected to French colonial rule, resisted its policy of "divide and rule", and struggled gallantly for their countries' independence in the 1950s (Morocco) and 1960s (Algeria). In the post independence decade, Berbers in both countries evolved their own cultural aspirations as a distinct group. The Moroccan king accommodated those aspirations; while the Algerian FLN ruling single party stunted them. In the 1990s, the Moroccan Berbers seem far more integrated in the national politics of their - country than their Algerian counterparts. The latter have increasingly been agitating for cultural recognition. The threat of Islamic militancy, with its "over-Arabization" tendencies, is quickly turning the Algerian Berbers' cultural quest into an equally militant political protest. [28] At present (1994), the Algerian state is under severe, double cross-pressure of both Islamic and Berber militants. [29], Thus, while Morocco is sailing towards steady democratization with its Arabs and Berbers alike, Algeria is disintegrating under the militancy of some Arab and Berber groups.
Sudan is another illustrative case. Out of 38 years of independence (1956-1994), the country had only ten years of relative calmness between the black Negroid South and the Arab-Muslim North (1972-1982). Those ten peaceful years were due to the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAAs) which provided for Southern Self Rule. When the Numairy military regime reneged on the AAAs in 1983 by restoring Khartoum's direct rule and imposed Islamic Shari'a on non-Muslims, the South flared up again in an armed insurrection. The situation has not improved despite the succession of three different regimes since then (1985, 1986, 1989). [30]
Thus, while Morocco and Algeria represent two comparative simultaneous test cases of governance and ethnic management, Sudan represents a one diachronic test case of such management. The conclusion is basically the same: nowadays, societies that are ethnically pluralistic, have to be also politically pluralistic.
In conclusion, the way out of the present dilemmas of all Arab states, but
especially those with marked ethnic diversity, is a triangular formula of civil
society, democracy, and federalism. This strength would be further enhanced by
regional peace and economic cooperation. In the mid 1990s, all the ingredients
are present. It only needs political imagination and the political will of new
leadership to skilfully engineer those ingredients together into a harmonious
regional mosaic.
Appendix
Most of these figures are approximations estimated or prorated from the following sources:
Most of these figures are approximations, reached by the same two methods noted in Tables 1 and 2 (the last official enumeration plus the percentage of natural increase; that is similar to the natural increase of the total number of inhabitants in the countries where those groups live to the following years of the last census. Or, taking the average of the maximum and minimum mentioned estimations in the trustworthy references dealing with that topic.
We mainly depended on the following references:
Most of these figures are approximations, reached by two methods. The last official enumeration plus the percentage of natural increase that is similar to the natural increase of the total of inhabitants in the countries where those groups live, for the years following the last census. Or, taking the average of the maximum and minimum estimates mentioned in the trustworthy references dealing with the topic.
We mainly depended on the following references:
2. For details and documentation see, Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. Sects, Ethnicity, and Minority Groups in the Arab World. (in Arabic) Cairo: Ibn Khaldoun Center, 1994, pp. 15-18, and pp. 225-290), pp. 323-369, and pp. 601-629. [*]
4. See also Diamond and Plattner's definition in Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict.. op.cit, p. XVII; Fukuyama, Francis, "The End of History," The National Interest, No. 16 (summer 1989) pp. 3-18, and Idem, The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992, p. 201. [*]
5. For full account of civil armed conflicts in Iraq, Sudan, and Lebanon, see Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, Sects, Ethnicity and Minority Groups... op.cit pp. 225-290, pp. 323-360, and pp. 601-629. [*]
7. A full debate has raged among Arab intellectuals over a proposed conference on the "UN Declaration on Minorities' Rights and Peoples of the Arab World and the Middle East" that was to be held in Cairo May 12-14, 1994. The prominent Egyptian writer and journalist, M.H. Haikal led the charge against the conference in an article "The Copts are an Integral Part of the National Mass" Al-Ahram, April 20, 1994. Some 240 Arab intellectuals joined the debate between April and September 1994. Two-thirds of the debators denied the existence or belittled the minorities issue in the Arab World. See Civil Society and Democratic Transformation in the Arab World (CSDTAW) Newsletter, April - October 1994. [*]
8. For an account of socio-political developments see, Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, The Future of Society and State in the Arab World. (in Arabic), Amman: The Arab Thought Forum, 1988; Hudson, Michael, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980; Luciani, G. (editors), The Arab State. Berkely: University of Press, 1990. [*]
9. Korn, George. Variety of Religions and Regimes. A Comparative Sociological and Legal Study, (Beirut: El Nahar Publishing Center, 1979) pp. 196-261 (Arabic). [*]
10. Megezil, Joseph. "Islam and Arab Christianity, Arab Nationalism and Secularism" in The Seminar of Arab Nationalism and Islam. pp. 361-384 (Arabic). Zuraique, Constantine in his comment on Waguih Kawthrany's research, "The Christians from the System of Sects to the Modern State". in his book The Debate of Arab Christians (p. 75). El Shair, Gamal, "What are the Reasons of Susceptibility and What are their Ranges?" in the Debate of Minorities in the Arab East and the Attempts of Israel to Use Them. Amman 12-15/9/1981. (Arabic) [*]
11. See the proceedings of the Constituent Conference of al-Baath Party as they were narrated in Aflaq, Michael, For the Cause of Banth, Beirut, El Tali'a Publishing Center, 1978. First Part p. 121. (Arabic) For more information about the Baath's attitude towards Minorities, see: Dandeshly, Mostafa: The Arab Socialist Baath Party, Part 1: Ideology and Political History, Beirut, El Talia Publishing Center 1979, pp. 92-95. Also, see Al-Duri, A. "The Historical Roots of Arab Nationalism" in Hopkins, N. and Ibrahim, Saad Eddin (editors), Arab Society, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, Second Edition, 1985, pp. 20-35. [*]
12. See Yassin, El Sayed and others: Content Analysis of the National Arab Thought, (Beirut: the Center of Arab unity Studies. 1980), p. 52. (Arabic) [*]
13. See Al Hosary, Sati: What is Nationalism? Beirut The Center of Arab Unity Studies, 1985 (originally published in 1958) p. 175. (Arabic) [*]
14. Diamond and Plattner, op.cit. p. XVIII. [*]
15. Packradoni, Karim, "Toward Ethnically Egalitarian Arab Societies" a paper submitted to the conference on The UN Declaration on Minorities' Rights and Peoples of the Arab World and the Middle East, Limassol, Cyprus, May 12-14, 1994. [*]
16. See the 1993 Arab Strategic Report, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 1994. [*]
17. The Iraqi elite led by Saddam Hussain's clan since 1968, comes from the Arab Sunni Muslim town of Takrit. The Sunni Muslims of Iraq do not exceed 35 per cent of Iraqi's total population - compared to over 45.0 per cent Arab Shi'i Muslims, and 15.0 per cent Kurdish Muslims. The Syrian elite led by Hafez al-Assad's clan since 1970s, comes from a small Alawite Shi'a sect which constitutes no more than 16.0 per cent of Syria's total population (see Appendix Tables A and B). [*]
18. See an analysis of recent events in Civil Society and Democratic Transformation in the Arab World (CSDTAW), Newsletter, April-August issues of 1994. [*]
19. Lebanon is the only exception among Arab states, where a constitutional tradition provides that the head of state be a Christian Maronite. [*]
20. Review constitutional texts and similar documents of Arab Countries in Sarhal, Ahmed, Political and Constitutional Systems in Lebanon and the Arab Countries: Beirut, El-Baath Publishing Center, 1980 (Arabic). [*]
22. Ibrahim, S. E., Future of Society and State in the Arab World. op.cit. pp. 400-450. [*]
23. About the same topic in regard to the Arab World see:
Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development" in the American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No, 3, September 1961, pp. 493, and Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality. Second Edition, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, 1966.
Ibrahim S. E., Bridging the Gap Between Decision-Makers and Intellectuals in the Arab World. Amman, the Arab Thought Forum, 1984, pp. 16-32. (Arabic)
Lerner, Daniel, The Passing at Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958.
Harik, Iliya, "The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle East".International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 3, No.3, July 1972, pp. 303, 323.
- Ghalyoum, Bourhan, The Sectarian Issue and the Problem of the Minorities. MMS, 1986, pp. 71-79. (Arabic). [*]
24. Ibrahim, S.E., Sects, Ethnicity and Minority Groups.. op.cit. pp. 735-740 [*]
27. Minorities Concerns in the Arab World, 1993 Report, Cairo: Ibn Khaldoun Center, 1994, pp. 282-283 [*]
28. "The Berbers Demand a Voice". Al-Ahram Weekly, October 20, 1994, p. 5 [*]
30. Minorities Concerns in the Arab World, the 1993 Annual Report, Cairo: Ibn Khaldoun Center, 1994. [*]
© The author and Nordic Society for Middle Eastern Studies. Archived 13.12.95