Rania Maktabi
FAFO Institute for Applied Social Science, Oslo
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Ghassan Salamé - a noted Lebanese scholar - has, however, high hopes regarding the development of democratic governance in the small and pluralistic states of Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon (hereafter JKL). According to him, the advantage of these small Arab states is that they have taken into account the existing richness in religious and social identities and tried to organize pluralism politically. 'Small countries will end up showing their more powerful neighbours that liberal democratization and political pluralism come by way of recognition rather than the denial of the existence of various social segments', Salamé points out (1994:108).
This paper seeks to ponder more deeply into Salamé's hypothesis regarding the recognition and organization of difference, and its effect on democratic governance in divided societies, i.e. societies where ascriptive identities (ethnic, religious and tribal) prevail in various forms. More precisely the two main following questions are discussed: First, is there a relation between the recognition of various social segments (such as religious, ethnic and tribal groups) and political pluralism (generally defined as political participation in the form of competitive parliamentary representation, and wider frames for group mobilization)? Second, does this recognition promote liberal democratization and political pluralism as Salamé indicates? These questions are discussed with emphasis on the 'politics of citizenship', defined as structures for membership in the state and procedures of political participation in the polity, as an analytical framework.
Geo-politically, Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon are small states surrounded by regional powers (Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq) that continuously threaten their survival as sovereign states. All three live in the shade of pro-Western regimes and rely - to different degrees - on the financial and military goodwill and support of the West for external as well as internal security. [2]
The insignificant defensive role of the military in external matters is shared by the three states. Internally however, the para-military security forces provide the regime with valuable support. The tight alliance between the Transjordanian dominated army and the monarch in Jordan is a case in point. So is the case in Kuwait where the regime has allied itself with loyal officials of beduin background who constitute the bulk of the internal security forces. In Lebanon, the tri-partite relationship between the Maronite dominated regime, the military and the Phalangist party was a potent relationship until the outbreak of the civil war in 1975.
In the economic sphere, JKL rely heavily on the attribution and allocation of externally derived revenues such as rent (in the case of Kuwait), politically motivated loans and grants, and emigrant remittances (in the cases of Jordan and Lebanon).
The sheer survival of JKL as independent states in hostile political surroundings is remarkable and can be partly explained by the central role of constitutional arrangements, and the existence of explicit political pacts between rulers and ruled. [3] A marked result of pact formation and reformulation has been the relatively successful political participation projects [4] among significant economic and social groups that are embodied in the historical pacts, and the creation of considerable room for unrestricted public opinion and free press.
All three states have suffered from creating and maintaining a state-identity [5] that is accepted and revered by the population. This is most acutely experienced by Lebanon, and to a lesser degree by Jordan and Kuwait. The modern political history of all three states demonstrate successful and less successful attempts at molding particular ideas regarding the identity of the state that are compatible with the ruling objectives of governors and accepted by the governed.
JKL have experienced tremendous 'exogenous population inputs' in terms of immigration and settlement of refugees and non-national labor force that have caused a substantial impact on the demographic and social structure in each country. The single most politically significant multifaceted group is constituted of Palestinian former and current refugees who either remain refugees, have become stateless or naturalized subjects of the country in which they reside. [6] In two states - Kuwait and Lebanon - we find cases of statelessness that evolved in the aftermath of the creation of the modern state in the 1920s. [7] Together, non-citizens in JKL consist of stateless residents (unregistered persons, qayd ad-dars in Lebanon, Bidun in Kuwait), long-term emigrants, and significant groups of Arab and Asian migrant workers. [8]
It is this latter characteristic - the reception and residence of substantial numbers of non-citizens and their permanent residence in the state - that I find especially interesting in the cases of JKL. Each state has addressed the sizeable non-citizen population in a variety of ways, and applied different citizenship policies regarding membership, naturalization, residence and immigration, in order to resolve the following challenges: Who were to be included as members of the polity? Who were to be excluded? The focus on the membership policies of these states springs from the insight that membership and participation are intimately linked: Those included as members of the state, i.e. the state's citizens, are also those that gain the right to participate in the formation of rules and norms in the polity.
In the context of unsettled and contested membership of substantial groups of residents in JKL, the concepts of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' appear fruitful. Forms of membership in the state as well as processes of political participation in JKL have varied over time in terms of including and excluding members (i.e. potential participants) and in terms of extending or restricting the scope of political participation. The concepts of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' allow us to consider not only the political participation of those already included as citizens. The concepts also encourage us to draw a wider circle and take into consideration the relationship between citizens and non-citizens, and the impact of exclusion on the processes of political participation of those included. According to Ayubi
[t]he concept of inclusion/exclusion is more useful than the restricted concepts of representation and participation because it implies both socio-economic and political involvement [...] We seem [...] to be having a whole variety of 'arrangements' [...] for sorting out the relationship between the groups and the state; some are collaborative and inclusionary: tribal confederations, national fronts, populist coalitions, ethnic consociations, etc.; while some are more conflictual and exclusionary: subordination, encapsulation and segmentary 'capture' of the state apparatus. (1995:33-34).Following these insights, the concepts of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' are used in discussing the character and form of political participation instead of applying indicators such as membership in associations, party politics, turnover in political elections and representative channels which are common when we study political activity in Western liberal democracies.
In the following, some alternative viewpoints on the relation between the recognition of difference and political pluralism in JKL are represented within an analytic framework where the politics of citizenship is central.
An immediate outcome of religious pluralism is the legal disparities that ensue, submitting citizens to various private legal codes that undermine equal forms of citizenship statuses. Before we address political pluralism we have to probe closer into the impact of legal pluralism. In JKL, we find structures and processes that differentiate between legal statuses among the state's inhabitants. Historically, the legacy of the Ottoman millet system whereby non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire were granted autonomy in internal affairs explains partly the manifestation of ethnic, religious and legal status differences. A second reason is the reluctance of inhabitants in Arab states to feel comfortable with the basically secular idea of citizenship where ethnic and social identities are rendered irrelevant. Salamé offers a third explanation when he points that the shari'a 'easily admits the principle of plural legislation, particularly in the matter of personal status' and that it therefore might be 'easier to establish religious (and consequently legal) pluralism than political pluralism.' (1994:6).
My perspective is one that sees the divergent forms of inclusive and exclusive membership policies in the state and in religious groups, as forms that illustrate the politicization of difference rather than mere recognition of difference. While I agree with Salamé on basic characteristics of JKL, I disagree with him on a central point: What he sees as positive 'recognition' of religious and social segments, I see as more or less compulsive institutionalization that legitimize and maintain different forms of legal status disparities among the state's inhabitants. Hajjar makes the same point in an analysis of what she terms as Israel's 'identity policy' towards its Druze minority:
the politics of identity defy the reified parameters of the mosaic paradigm, despite its legacy in the spheres of national and international politics. To make a group identity the basis of policy is to create rather than simply 'realize' the importance of difference. (1996:6).In the cases of JKL, we not only get divergent religious legal codes (especially in Jordan and Lebanon) among the state's inhabitants. The development of disparate and intricate systems of legal status categorization of the state's inhabitants in all three states (materialized through a conglomerate of identity cards and citizenship categories) are indirect outcomes of the political recognition of religious and ethnic pluralism. [9] Apparently, while the ruling regimes recognizes the differences between religious and ethnic groups, and accommodate citizens differently, [10] they also address the presence of non-citizen migrants and refugees by equipping them with different legal identities that determine their relationship to the state. The aspect of control and coercion is central in creating and maintaining differential treatment among citizens and non-citizens in JKL as in most authoritarian Arab states. The form of coercion, however, is represented in different ways, and it varies in degree in different periods of time. In JKL we find cases of inclusionary as well as exclusionary forms of coercion and control. As Crystal indicates, the authoritarianism displayed in some states in the Middle East is not based solely on coercion. Authoritarianism can also be populist, inclusionary and participatory (1994:274) - an insight which fits well as a description of the segmental application of control that appears through the politics of citizenship in JKL.
In Kuwait and Lebanon, control and coercion take on the form of restricted - or at least closely monitored - membership at the state, group and individual levels. On the individual level, personal documentation papers have acquired disproportionately high importance as verifications of the status of each resident. The multiple categorization of residents that inhabit the state creates an apparent need for extensive internal security agencies in order to monitor the population which the regime claims is needed due to the significant presence of non-citizens, usually addressed as a composite body of 'foreigners'. The net result is, seen from the perspective of the rulers, quite reassuring: the regime can legitimize the maintenance of its well-equipped internal security agencies and repressive institutions that monitor the movements and actions of, not only those regarded as foreigners, but the entire population within the state's territory.
Control at the group level can be discerned in the involuntary nature of group membership in JKL. Moon (1993) applies the term 'pluralist encapsulation' to describe the involuntary nature whereby individuals are born into and become members of groups. He explains that 'encapsulation'
pass[es] the celebration of diversity in multicultural states to proposing policies that erect boundaries among groups, in part by strengthening their authority over their members, and in part by formally assigning public status to individuals in terms of their ascribed group identities. (1993:182).'Recognition' is thus a term that characterizes the autonomous status of groups in positive terms, while 'encapsulation' focuses on the control aspects of group membership in these basically non-liberal polities. Non-liberal in terms of the non-existence of alternatives to group membership for individual citizens in personal legal matters. Citizens are supposed to (and thereby forced to) abide by the rules and norms of their religious group in internal affairs, delegating thereby parts of the state's sovereignty over coercive legal means to the leadership of these groups. [11]
At the state level, the relationship between individuals and the state are gendered, monitored by the state, and indirectly mediated through group membership. [12] Citizens in Jordan and Lebanon have no opportunity to refrain from being members of confessional groups because an ascribed membership in a group is required in order to obtain rights and privileges and vote due to the delegation of private legal matters to different religious codes. In Lebanon, a citizen votes implicitly as a member of one of the 18 acknowledged confessional groups due to the preset distribution of seats in a particular constituency. In Kuwait, membership in the state is not only restricted but multi-faceted because it differentiates between first-class citizens and second-class citizens. The legal status of children is inherited patrilineally, maintaining (until 1998) the legal and political distinctions between first- and second class Kuwaiti citizens, as well as the stateless status of an increasingly larger Bidun population. [13]
I agree with Salamé that there is a relation between the recognition of social segments in JKL and a corresponding higher degree of political pluralism in these polities. We differ, however, in seeing the relevance of recognizing religious and ethnic identities and the net fruitful effect of recognition in developing liberal democratization and political pluralism. Recognition of religious pluralism entails not only autonomy over the internal affairs of groups and dynamic alliance formations among these groups, as Salamé indicates. The 'dark side' of recognition is is expressed in selective and differential forms of inclusion in the state through coercive and legal means that establish and maintain various forms of affiliations between individuals and the state. In addition to the recognition of religious and ethnic identities, the regime identifies legal differences among the inhabitants of the state which, rather than inviting to wider forms of political participation, maintain and enhance the political prerogatives of those in power, i.e. the ruling regime and its allies among the population.
An analysis of structures and processes of the 'politics of citizenship' found in JKL provide insights into the inclusionary and exclusionary policies as practiced in each state after independence.
The difference between the structural and procedural aspects of the concept of citizenship can be illustrated in the well-known allegory that describes democratic processes by alluding to a cake which is sought cut in 'equal shares'. Within this context, cutting the cake in equal shares indicate a procedural element. Focus on the structural element of democracy would, however, crystallize if we ask: Who is invited to the party, and who is left out? (Rae 1979:39). [14]
The politics of citizenship comprises thus two sets of connected but analytically separate questions. First, the question of citizenship relates to the expansion or contraction of membership in the state whereby non-citizens such as immigrants, ethnic groups, minorities and stateless are included or excluded as formal and legitimate subjects of the state. In this sense, citizenship is defined as a legal status distributed, withheld or reclaimed according to the political priorities of the state, as expressed by the ruling authority through citizenship laws and regulations. Citizenship can thereby be seen as a control instrument in the hands of rulers. All states divide their subjects into different legal classes. What is central in the cases of JKL (as well as Israel) is the importance of these divisions for the understanding of political processes and power constellations in the state. Citizenship, defined as a status, can be seen as a mechanism of political authority and domination that demonstrates the sovereignty of the state, and the power of the authoritarian regime over its subjects. [15]
Secondly, the question of citizenship relates to the extension or restriction of democratic participation whereby citizens are either allowed to share or are barred from participating in the governance of their polity and partaking in the process of producing and redistributing the state's material and social resources. In the case where citizens are offered wider participation arenas, citizenship represents a marker of inclusion in a democratization process that covers issues and institutions governed by principles not previously subject to citizen participation and regime accountability. [16] In the case where citizens are prevented from partaking in the formation of rules and norms in the polity, exclusion is marked and the regime exposes a higher degree of authoritarian rule. As a result, citizenship - defined as a participatory project - is stripped from its content. Within this context a focus on the politics of citizenship considers the joint or disentangled efforts of rulers and ruled to mobilize towards or away from a democratization process. Contrary to the first definition of citizenship where it is seen as an instrument of political control in the hands of rulers, the second definition of citizenship carries a normative incentive: The ruled should have a say in the formation of rules that regulate their polity. The quest of participation based on democratic rules turns citizenship into an instrument of legitimation in the hands of the ruled.
The politics of citizenship encompasses a range of policies that govern membership in the state. The structural element of the politics of citizenship is operationalized by reviewing citizenship laws and regulations, naturalization and immigration policies as well as forms of permits for residency in the state. The procedural element of the politics of citizenship is operationalized by identifying forms of bargaining processes and alliances between dominant economic, social and political groups in society that eventually take the form of explicit pacts.
Some of the structures and procedures of the politics of citizenship can be discerned through a closer look at the process of state-building since 1920 whereby power was centralized under the auspices of dynastic led regimes in Jordan and Kuwait, and under a confessionally-based elite group (the Maronites) in Lebanon.
Rokkan identifies four main dimensions of state-formation: First, the dimension of force relates to the penetration phase that initiates state-building. The strength of extractive capacities and the strength of opposition against extractive capacities, as well as balance between internal and external resources of military agencies (alliances, territorial temptations) are central parameters of this phase. Second, the dimension of culture reflects the standardization phase that characterizes processes of nation-building. The culture dimension illustrates the strength of standardizing agencies and standardizing counter-agencies, and the distinctiveness of sharedness of religious and/or linguistic standards. Third, the dimension of law highlights the strength of center-imposed vs. local legal traditions, as well as the distinctiveness vs. sharedness of territorial legal system, and the equalization of rights of participation are important parameters. Fourth, the dimension of economy reflects the degree of integration or separation of primary economy with or from city networks, as well as the degree of openness vs closedness of the territorial economy.(1975:570-575).
With regards to our central analytical framework - the politics of citizenship in JKL - these dimensions are relevant because Rokkan identifies two forms of citizenship related to the dimensions of law and economy. The procedural aspect of citizenship, i.e. participation in forming rules of governance through elections and representation, is addressed by Rokkan as 'political citizenship' under the law dimension to underline the equalization principle of the rights of participation. The economy dimension involves, according to Rokkan, the development of 'social citizenship' whereby the redistribution of resources and benefits among citizens is carried out. He does not refer explicitly to the structural dimension of citizenship, i.e. the distribution of membership, but - building on his model - the constitution of the citizenry falls logically under the force dimension that characterizes the penetration phase in the state-building process. Following Rokkan's typology, the distribution of citizenship and the classification of the legitimate members of the state can be referred to as 'legal citizenship' under the dimension of force. The reason being that the constitution of the citizenry is a political act that expresses the sovereignty of the state over those it defines as its subjects, rather than a process of equalization of rights that falls under the dimension of law. [17]
The state-formation process of JKL following the downfall of the Ottoman Empire until today covers the range of confrontations and struggles that evolve in the course of the penetration, standardization, equalization and redistribution processes which Rokkan points at. Kuwait gained an autonomous position in 1920 and the Sabbah regime managed to consolidate its power internally by resisting the attacks of other tribal adversaries, and externally by maintaining the Treaty with the British Empire signed in 1899. Greater Lebanon was established as an autonomous entity under French mandatory rule in September 1920 and a Maronite dominated regime evolved and manifested its position further in the 1943 National Pact between the three main confessional groups in the country. King Abdallah of Jordan managed to consolidate his power and cemented it by establishing the emirate of Transjordan in March 1921.
Parallel with the process of power consolidation of rulers, the political identity of the ruled changed character. The populations previously known as Ottoman citizens became citizens of newly established states. The Lausanne Treaty of 1923 granted former Ottoman subjects citizenry in the newly established states. Judging from the significant numbers of long-term stateless persons, the multi-faceted legal disparities among inhabitants, and the significant proportions of non-citizens in all three states today, the distribution of legal citizenship appears to have been exceptionally problematic in Kuwait and Lebanon. Jordan on the other hand, represents a case where the distribution of legal citizenship was exceptionally generous following the mass naturalization of Palestinian refugees into Jordanian citizens in 1954 - a step that doubled the size of the Jordanian citizenry at the time.
While the penetration process resulted in the consolidation of the power of the regimes in JKL, there remained a range of challenges that a state formation process entails, according to Rokkan. The two most interesting in terms of citizenship are the efforts of the equalization of religious standards with regards to the distinctiveness or sharedness of territorial legal system, and the equalization of the rights of participation. In view of the autonomous position of confessional groups and the existence of disparate legal codes in JKL, it is clear that the strength of standardizing agencies have been low, giving rise to a high degree of distinctiveness in religious identification. We may ask: Is this recognition a result of the strength of standardizing counteragencies found in society, or is recognition rather the result of government initiated orientation that does not aim at establishing and enforcing equalization in legal standards?
Apparently, both governmental agents and social groups have been responsive to a policy of distinctiveness because both parties gain from the arrangement. On the one hand, religious communities are granted autonomy and recognition in internal affairs creating means that solidify the leadership of groups and the ethnic identification of followers. On the other hand, regimes are permitted to address society in segmental ways, opening the way for structurally differentiated forms of relationships between rulers and ruled in terms of membership and participation in the state. The politicization of this segmentarity occurs in two ways. First, when a regime seeks to make use of these differences in ways that are consistent with particular ruling strategies where the survival of the regime is paramount. Second, when a particular agreement is cemented into more or less conservative pacts that keep both economic, social and ethnical elites politically dominant. The variances found in the politics of citizenship between the states, as well as within each state at different historical times, suggest that membership policies relate to forms and structures of political participation in ways that account for distinctions and illuminate variances in the organization of political power in the three states.
Some insights into the relationship between citizenship seen as membership and participation are presented in the following.
| Membership | Participation | |||
| Expansion | Contraction | Extension | Restriction | |
| Jordan | 1954: Naturlization of Palestinian Refugees. Jordan's citizenry doubled to appr. 1 million) |
1988: Denaturalization of West Bank Palestinians. Appr. 750,000 former Jordanian citizens on the West Bank are made stateless | 1956: Free and fair elections. 1989 Parliamentary election. 1990 National Charter |
1957 - 1988: Restricted and more or less controlled elections. 1970 civil war |
| Kuwait | 1960-1970: Selective expansion by naturalizing loyal tribes | 1986: The Bidun-population is defined as a problem. 1992: Contraction of the Kuwaiti citizenry by deleting 200,000 Bidun from the category 'Kuwaiti citizens' in official census figures |
1962 Constitution Pact. 1990 Taif Pact |
Suspension of parliament in 1976 and 1986. 1990 Iraqi invasion |
| Lebanon | 1932 -1975: ethnically selective naturalization: Citizenship in favor of persons of Christian background. [18] 1994: Citizenship decree naturalizes appr. 120,000 |
1932 -1975: ethnically selective naturalization: Citizenship denied to stateless and persons of Muslim background. Palestinian community excluded | 1943 National Pact. 1989 Taif Pact |
1. 1920-1975 structural restriction. 2. 1975-1989 civil war. 3. 1990 until date: structural restriction baked into consociative system |
The table stands as a reference to the factual events that can be linked to outcomes and impacts of policies that affect membership and participation. The comparative and empirical links between the two dimensions - membership and participation - are still to be analyzed in depth in my thesis. Suffice it to present in this context the theoretical and philosophical relationship between the question of membership and participation in JKL which I argue are intimately related in the cases of JKL.
My argument builds on Dahl's (1989) and Butenschøn's (1993) insights regarding the structural impact of membership on participation, and its relation to various forms of democratic and non-democratic governance. [19] Dahl addresses the question of membership as a 'problem of inclusion': 'What persons have a rightful claim to be included in the demos?' (1989:119). By 'demos' he refers to the body of persons that ought to comprise 'the people', i.e. the citizen body of a political entity, and argues that
Advocates of democracy - including political philosophers - characteristically presuppose that a 'people' already exists. Its existence is assumed as a fact, a creation of history. Yet the facticity of the fact is questionable. It is often questioned - as it was in the United States in 1861, when the issue was settled not by consent or consensus but by violence. (1989:3).The violent process which Dahl refers to is, of course, the American civil war that stretched between 1861-1865 whereby the Southern states were forcefully joined in the Federate state. As a result, Black Americans were given the nominal right to be included as subjects of the state (although their rights as equal citizens did not materialize until more than a century later). What Dahl stresses by pointing at the violent process of the constitution of the citizenry in the United States is that the question of inclusion in the polity has been taken as an implicit factor in the analysis of the political formation of Western states. He turns our attention to the historical constitutive legacy of a particular demos and citizenry, and argues that 'who should be included in the demos' represents an intractable domain in democratic theory and practice. (1989:116). The inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the demos of a particular political system has, according to Dahl, implications on forms and procedures of decisionmaking in a polity. He differentiates between a political system that is democratic in relation to its own demos, and a political system that is democratic in relation to everyone subject to its rules. The first category is procedurally democratic in a narrow sense because it covers polities whereby the demos is constituted primarily of citizens who have the opportunity to vote and participate in making binding decisions. The second category allows a demos which includes both citizens and others subject to the state's rule the opportunity to have final control over the political agenda through a democratic process. According to Dahl, only if the demos is inclusive enough to meet this latter criterion could the process of decisionmaking be described as fully democratic. (1989:108-114, 130). [20] In short, Dahl emphasizes the element of inclusiveness and exclusiveness of a particular demos when he discusses procedures of democratic political participation. Furthermore, he indicates that the constitution of a particular citizenry may well be settled through violent means in order to become democratic in a wider sense.
In Kuwait and Lebanon, we find that political pluralism has been, for a substantial period of time, exclusive in terms of the demos that is subject to the polity's rules, while Jordan has been particularly inclusive in terms of expanding the body of its citizenry. My argument is that the inclusive and exclusive character of the demos has been maintained or attempted changed in each state in different ways over time, and that each demos configuration affects the nature of the democratic procedure in the polity. The political pluralism we find in JKL has therefore to take heed of the inclusiveness and exclusiveness of the citizenry and the political agenda that each demos constitution engender.
In an analysis of democracy and ethnic conflict, Butenschøn builds further along Dahl's line of reasoning and presents the logical ranking of first-order and second-order problems. According to him, first-order problems relate to the 'constitution of the demos, the political entity's demographic identity and extent', while second-order problems relate to the constitution of political order based on one particular or alternative definitions of demos whereby the structure of the political system- the regime- is agreed upon. (1997:2). Butenschøn differentiates thus analytically between the process of constituting a citizenry and the subsequent process which a particular body of citizens undertakes in forming and applying rules that govern the polity. [21]
The distinction between first-order and second-order issues fits well into the analytical framework of the politics of citizenship. While the structural dimension of the politics of citizenship (membership) addresses first-order problems, the procedural dimension (political participation) addresses second-order issues. In the cases of JKL, I argue that the process of defining the citizenry of the state (first-order problems) has since the 1920s constantly intertwined and entangled with confrontations that evolve around the distribution of political power and the forming of rules and norms that govern the polity (second-order problems). What we are witnessing in JKL with regards to the politics of citizenship is the fusion between first- and second-order problems whereby membership issues as well as participation issues are addressed simultaneously. Each state has opted to resolve the 'problem of inclusion' in different ways by applying citizenship policies that have changed over time according to the ruling strategies of the regime. The variances that we find in membership policies are linked to questions of participation because membership has a fundamental impact on internal political power balances, especially in ethnically divided states. In these states, the question of membership became politicized with the impact of nationalism and ideals regarding democratic governance in the beginning of this century. The ideal of one-man one vote transformed the demographic size of each community into a political determinant: the more the numeric strength, the more powerful its political influence (Butenschøn 1993:4).
Seen from this perspective, it is clear that the regime becomes politically sensitive towards the ethnic identities and confessional belonging of its demos when it recognizes and identifies its demos in segmental ways. This recognition perpetuates and strengthens the preoccupation of regimes in controlling membership in the state: Citizenship becomes an important political instrument in orchestrating an optimal demos as seen from the perspectives of ruling regimes. The exclusion of undesired groups, the inclusion of desired groups, or policies where both strategies are mixed in order to attain a particular political outcome can be identified in the three states. One of the arenas where the impact of membership on participation can be discerned is the process whereby political pacts are formulated and reformulated in each state. A discussion of the basis of these pacts and the ways in which they are shaped and reshaped allows us to the dig deeper into the relationship between membership and participation in JKL.
In Lebanon, the fusion of membership and participation problems is particularly complex due to the preset political set up whereby political representation is divided among groups on a confessional basis. We can, however, detect the structural aspects of membership in the ethnically biased citizenship policies applied in order to maintain the demographic basis that could preserve a political arrangement reached at one point in time. Between 1932 and 1975, issues regarding membership in the state were not addressed politically, i.e. they were not addressed as first-order issues but were fused as implicit parts of second-order issues. The separation appeared clearly following the civil war when the Taif agreement (which ended the civil war) in 1989 stated explicitly that a new citizenship law should be formed. Five years later, the regime sought to solve the issue of statelessness and the presence of non-citizens through a naturalization decree (refraining from issuing a law) - a step which explicitly singled out the Palestinian refugee community as the main non-citizen alien resident group in the country.
In Kuwait, membership is not only exclusive in character by including only approximately a third of the country's population, it is also stratified due to its distinction between first-class Kuwaitis who have political and economic rights, and second-class Kuwaitis who, until 1996, enjoyed only economic rights. The politics of citizenship, as applied by the regime, has aimed at containing participation within a narrow constituency, at the same time as naturalization policies aimed at bolstering the position of the regime. A two-track citizenship policy was applied: The stateless Bidun were included as part of the Kuwaiti citizenry by granting them all necessary living condition services (health, education, housing and jobs in the army) as well as counting them as 'Kuwaitis' in all official census data in order to enlarge the demographic size of Kuwaitis. The Bidun were, however, never granted citizenship. At the same time particular groups (beduin tribes) that were regarded as loyal to the Sabbah regime were granted citizenship in order to bolster the position of the ruling regime in elections. The pact formed between rulers and citizens in 1962 has been challenged several times resulting in the suspension of the parliament twice (1976 and 1986). In both occasions, allegations against electoral fraud, corruption and mass naturalization of tribal groups were voiced. Kuwait represents perhaps the clearest case where the demos is attempted molded and formed in ways that is politically agreeable to the regime. The exclusiveness of membership has, moreover, tacitly been accepted by rulers and citizens due to the generous financial benefits that Kuwaiti citizenship entails for its bearers. The tangible goods attached to citizenship alerts more clearly those already included as citizens of the potential loss of their privileges if the demos is expanded, fostering and enhancing the structures of exclusiveness and maintaining the exclusive political participatory arena.
Of the three cases, it is clear that Jordan has addressed the question of membership seriously as a first-order issue by dealing with first-order membership issues before dealing with second-order issues. Already in 1954 the Jordanian citizenry was substantially expanded when Palestinian refugees were included as citizens. Some room for political participation was given until 1957 when parliamentarian life halted. It is interesting to note that it was after the denaturalization of West Bankers in 1988 that parliamentarian life once again was given a chance by the king in 1989, and a new pact, the 1990 National Charter that invited for more political reciprocity between rulers and ruled, was presented. In other words, in the case of Jordan, the resolving of second order issues (broader forms of parliamentary representation in 1956 and 1989) evolved after an expansion (1954) and a contraction (1988) of the citizenry was effected. The politics of citizenship as practiced in Jordan has been inclusive, opening up for the integration of Palestinian refugees as Jordanian citizens and thereafter addressing problems related to the distribution of power. While the inclusion of refugees shows the instrumental character of the politics of citizenship applied at one point of time, the coercive features of the Jordanian politics of citizenship was clearly demonstrated in 1988 when the Jordanian citizenry was reconstituted and reconsolidated. Having addressed a first-order issue with the contraction of the size of the citizenry as a result, the regime could once again open up and extend political participation a year later. [23]
In conclusion, I turn back to the two main questions I addressed at the beginning of the paper: First, is there a relation between the recognition of various social segments and political pluralism? In the cases of Jordan and Kuwait, it appears that the recognition of religious, tribal and ethnic differences does indeed generate group mobilization. In other words: Tuning in religion does turn on pluralism in JKL. When the citizens of the state are recognized as members of groups, these groups gain political importance which lead to their mobilization- especially at historical points when these groups engage in alliances with power-holders. This is the case in all three states where tribal, ethnic and confessional affinities have been strengthened with the development of the modern state because particular tribal and ethnic groups have been coopted or served as allies to the ruling regime..
Moving on to the second question on whether the recognition of religious pluralism promotes liberal democratization and political pluralism, as Salamé indicates, the relationship becomes complicated, and not as straightforward as Salamé implies. Recognition in JKL is not only expressed and reflected in the form of political pluralism in society, recognition is politicized because the significance of group identities are tolerated, legitimized and sought maintained through different means that include the politics of citizenship. Recognition of groups builds on accepting selective and unequal treatment of the state's inhabitants, whether they are citizens or non-citizens. Citizens are subject to disparate legal codes under family law, and non-citizens are subject to a variety of affiliation modes to the state. The plethora of legal status is both accepted and tolerated politically among the dominant groups in society because the alliance pattern in these states often take the shape of pacts that cement the political power of the most significant groups in society, and maintain political participation within narrow and restricted frames.
Complexities in analyzing the recognition of segmental groups in positive terms arise, furthermore, as a result of the non-liberal basis for group membership in JKL. In these societies there are no alternatives to the individual's subordination to particular religious or ethnic group membership. An individual's membership in a confessional, ethnic, tribal or national group is either mediated through patriarchal ascriptive laws that have legal and political repercussions, or through a particular state's citizenship laws. In non-secular societies where liberal ideals of individual rights are not entrenched - such as the case is in Arab states in general - there is a danger that the state's recognition of groups is based on encapsulation of members in ethnic and religious groups.
The question of membership is central to understanding political processes of democratization in JKL because forms of participation are contingent on the ways in which the citizenry is defined. The recognition of difference and political pluralism which Salamé points at, and which he relates to in positive terms, cannot be seen in disjunction to a potentially wider demos which the political pluralism alluded to does not include.
The pluralism that evolves is thus not of kind that leads to liberal democratization because basic liberal premises of citizenship such as equality before the law as well as equality in membership status are necessary conditions for the development of democratic governance. By dropping out citizenship - whether defined as exclusion from membership in the state or as the non-existence of legal equality among the citizenry - polities are less likely to strengthen and develop forms of governance that enhance democratic liberalization.
Butenschøn, N. 1993. Politics of Ethnocracies: Strategies and Dilemmas of Ethnic Domination. Paper presented at the National Conference of Political Science, Geilo, Norway, 11-12 January 1993.
____________. 1997. 'Demokrati og etnisk konflikt [Democracy and Ethnic Conflict] in Midgaard, K. and Rasch, B. Demokrati: Vilkår og virkninger. [Democracy: Conditions and Consequences]. Oslo: Fagbokforlaget.
Crystall, J.1994 'Authoritarianism and its adversaries in the Arab World' in World Politics, 46, January 1994.
Dahl, R. 1989. Democracy and its Critics. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Hajjar, L. 1996. 'Making Identity Policy: Israel's Interventions among the Druze&' in Middle East Report, July- September 1996.
Hauge, I. 1997. The Political Dynamics of Citizenship. An analysis of demographic structure, state-idea, and regime determinants of citizenship policies regarding the Palestinians in Israel Jordan and Lebanon. Thesis for the Cand. Polit. degree. Oslo: University of Oslo, Department of Political Science
Hartshorne, R. 1950. 'The Functional Approach in Political Geography'. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 40.
Leca, J. 1994. 'Democratization in the Arab World: uncertainty, vulnerability and legitimacy. A tentative conceptualization and some hypothesies' in Salame Democracy without Democrats. London, New York: I.B. Tauris.
Maktabi, R. 1996. 'State-Formation and Citizenship in Lebanon- The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion in a Sectarian State', paper presented in the conference 'Citizenship and the State in the Middle East', Oslo, November 22-24, 1996.
Moon, J.D. 1993. Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rae, D. 1979. 'The Egalitarian State: Notes on a System of Contradictory Ideals' in Daedalus, Fall 1979, no. 4.
Rokkan, S. 1975. 'Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe' in Tilly, C. (ed.) The Formation of National States in Western Europe. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Salamé, G. (ed.) 1994 Democracy without Democrats. London, New York: I.B. Tauris.
Walzer, M. [1983] 1994. Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality. Oxford / Cambridge: Blackwell.
2. Commenting on the pro-Western attitude of JKL and the democratic practices in 'small' as compared to 'large' Arab states, Salamé indicates: 'Because they are small, they have appeared to derive a kind of additional raison d'être as sovereign states from the democratic regimes they harboured. With their powerful neighbours menacing them close by, sometimes laying claim to all or part of their territory, they have found in their democratic practice a justification for their existence as sovereign states which they hope will arouse support at home and also abroad.' (1994:84). [*]
3. In Lebanon the National Pact of 1943 and the Taif Agreement of 1989 provide examples. In Kuwait the Constitution of 1962 and the Jeddah Agreement of 1990 represent pacts between rulers and ruled at historically crucial points of decision. In Jordan the National Charter of 1990 provides another example. [*]
4. Salamé characterizes the political processes in JKL as 'democratic process'. It is problematic to view political participation projects in JKL as democratic for reasons I will elaborate on further in the article. Suffice it to indicate here that restrictions on democratic political processes is paramount in all three states. Authoritarian monarchial hereditary rule prevails in Kuwait and Jordan, while the preset consociative political arrangement in Lebanon sets significant barriers on what is normatively seen as basic liberal democratic rules and practices. The political unwillingness of making an official updated census to the last one in 1932 and the inability of citizens to vote as members in the constituency where they reside (obliging them to travel to the villages of their grandparents) represent some important factors that defy basic principles of democratic governance. Furthermore, even though elections have been held in all three states, parliamentary representation has been more or less irregular, either due to suspension or due to civil war or conflict between rulers and ruled. [*]
5. 'State-idea' is a term that has been used by political geographers, among them Hartshorne, who notes: 'Each state must have a raison d'être- reason for existing' which is a 'basic centripetal force [...] justifying the existence of this particular state' (1950:110). Butenschøn refers to 'state-idea' as the normative foundation of the state (1993:15). The state-idea is at the core of perceptions on a wider set of issues, most notably ideas regarding who the most suitable and appropriate citizens of the state are according to the professed state-idea. In a polity, there are always more or less competing understandings of 'natives' and 'strangers', some entrenched, stable and accepted by a majority of the population, while others are undefined and complex, giving rise to more or less incompatible views regarding membership policies. [*]
6. In Jordan, the majority of former Palestinian refugees have been naturalized, and constitute presumably half the Jordanian citizenry. In Lebanon, the approximately 350,000 large Palestinian non-citizen population in Lebanon is still awaiting the fruits of a probable international solution to the Palestine refugee problem. In Kuwait, the approximately 300,000 Palestinian community was the largest diaspora community outside the Occupied Palestinian Territories until the Iraqi invasion in 1990. In all three states, the Palestinian presence has instigated divergent policies that have changed over time according to the regime's political objectives. More than any other migrant group, the multifaceted Palestinian population in JKL can be seen as a litmus test whereby the differential strategies implemented in order to include or exclude them in the host polity illuminate features of the processes of the politics of citizenship (Hauge 1997). [*]
7. The existence of stateless persons since the establishment of Kuwait and Lebanon indicates that problems related with the inclusion of members in the new states has not only been actualized by the dramatic increase of refugees and migrants in Kuwait and Lebanon. Evidently, the inclusion of new members in the state has been a contested and unresolved problem since the creation of the state. Problems related with inclusion in the state were aggravated - but not created - by immigrants and refugees [*]
8. Until 1994 approximately 15 per cent of the Lebanese 3,5 million population were non-citizens. The number of non-citizens was reduced to approximately 10 per cent when an estimated 120,000 persons were naturalized by decree in 1994, while the bulk of non-citizens remain Palestinian stateless refugees. In Jordan, approximately half of the 4,2 million citizens are of Palestinian origin and enjoy full citizenship rights. However, significant groups of persons (Gaza-Palestinians with Egyptian identity cards, former Jordanian West-Bank Palestinians who were denaturalized in 1988, and Gulf-returnees following the Kuwait's invasion by Iraq in 1990) endure an insecure legal position in the country where they permanently reside. In Kuwait, only 28 per cent of the 2,7 million inhabitants are Kuwaiti citizens. The non-citizen population is constituted mainly of migrant workers and stateless persons (known as the Bidun) that include approximately 200,000 persons. [*]
9. In Lebanon, the politicization and institutionalization of difference has a sectarian character in the sense that representation is based on the confessional belonging of citizens which is monitored by the state. Lebanese do not vote as Lebanese, but as members of their respected confessional sect in a pre-calculated proportional representative scheme. In Kuwait, legal status divisions between different citizen categories on the one hand, and between nationals and non-nationals on the other, render citizenship (membership in the state) as the single most important creator of political, economic, and social divisions in the Kuwaiti polity. The existence of oil wealth and the generous distribution of that wealth among citizens has enhanced and manifested the economic and political importance of citizenship. Jordan represents an interesting case in between. The institutionalization of difference has taken a religious form only to a certain degree: Religious communities have an autonomous legal status, and the main minorities (Circassians and Christians) are represented at the political level as groups with reserved seats in the government and parliament. Rather than differentiating between Transjordanians and Palestinians, Jordan's two main ethnic constituencies, the regime has actively tried to forge both as equal Jordanian citizens. This was formally established with the 1954 citizenship law that granted all Palestinian refugees Jordanian citizenship. Despite the Jordanization of Palestinian refugees, there still exist considerable groups of persons who are excluded from membership in the state, and who remain permanent non-citizens. [*]
10. 'Differently' in terms of granting autonomy in personal affairs and - to a certain degree - group representation in the government and parliament. [*]
11. This is especially pertinent in Jordan and Lebanon, less so in Kuwait due to the governmental control over religious agencies. [*]
12. By 'monitored', I mean that the religious identity of the individual is registered and filed by state agencies. [*]
13. With reference to Israel and the institutionalization of group identities at state level Hajjar indicates that 'the principle of equality is complicated by the legal significance of group identity. Unlike the US, the rights of citizens and their relationship to the state are oriented explicitly by official classifications and the politicization of group identities.' (1996:2). [*]
14. Rae argues that the state is always engaged in the differential distribution of resources among categories of its population, and points at five complications to the cutting of a hypothetical cake whereby the structural element represents the first complication. 'The cake, cut in equal slices, is served at a party to which a host has invited ten persons - but only ten. What, we may wonder, do the equal slices for this inner circle mean to those left behind altogether? Perhaps the most basic inequality has been inflicted before the cake is sliced or served.' (1979:39). [*]
15. It is important to indicate the sovereign nature of the state in issuing and distributing citizenship: It is the sole body that accords and dispatches membership in the polity. [*]
16. See Leca (1994:49) who refers to O'Donnel et al. (1986:80) for a discussion on citizenship seen as expansion and restriction of participation. [*]
17. By placing 'legal citizenship' under Rokkan's force dimension, rather than the law dimension, I underline that the classification of the population in a territorial entity is an outcome of penetration and centralization. The distribution of citizenship equips the legitimate members with a particular legal status, but the act of classification is coercive in nature and has significant political consequences that I elaborate on further. [*]
18. See my 'State-Formation and Citizenship in Lebanon- The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion in a Sectarian State' (Maktabi 1996). [*]
19. In an excellent chapter in his book Spheres of Justice (1983) Walzer deals with the question of membership but does not problematize the issue of exclusion. He states explicitly that his study addresses issues related to participation and democratic governance and lays as a premise that all subjects are members of a polity in the analysis. [*]
20. Dahl is sensitive to the conceptual and analytic differentiation between the terms demos and citizenry, but he fails to make an explicit distinction between the two terms when he portrays the four criteria of a democratic political process. The term citizens - obviously defined as those that are the legitimate members of the state, is applied when discussing the first three criteria of a political process (effective political participation, voting equality and enlightened understanding). Dahl reverts however to the term demos when the last criteria- final control over the agenda of matters - is discussed. Without making the point explicitly, the citizenry is enlarged into a demos which includes citizens as well as others subject to the rules of the polity. Final control over the political agenda includes, according to Dahl then, a non-specified demographic body more inclusive than a citizenry that is able to exercise control over the political agenda. This statement implies the ability of non-citizens that are subject to the rules of a particular polity to put the question of their inclusion in the polity on the agenda, provided that this quest is done democratically according to the first three criteria (1989:108-114). [*]
21. Dahl differentiates between the two different processes in a slightly different way: 'The demos being given, the scope of its agenda can be determined. The scope of its agenda being given, the composition of an appropriate demos to make decisions on those matters can be determined. But in principle, it seems, the one cannot finally be determined without the other.' (1989:119). [*]
22. Ayubi indicates that consociational arrangements (where pacts are central) can be seen as conservative arrangement that suits elites, and those already in possess of power. He questions the 'mild sympathy expressed towards this approach in general by various Arab writers' (1995:190-191; 193). Salamé falls clearly in this category. [*]
23. In the case of Jordan, external political processes regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have affected internal processes of national consolidation. An analysis of internal Jordanian political life necessarily implies a consideration of foreign policy strategies. [*]
© The author and Nordic Society for Middle Eastern Studies. Archived 29.3.99